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ABSTRACT: Since Sidney Winter published his paper on "Knowledge and competence as Strategic assets", the num-
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Since, in 1987, Sidney Winter published his paper on knowledge and management 
strategy ("Knowledge and competence as Strategic assets"), the number of relevant 
publications on this matter has immensely grown. Winter concluded that there was a 
serious dearth of appropriate terminology as well as of conceptual schemes to unders-
tand and analyze the role of knowledge in economics. Questions about the meaning of 
knowledge and knowledge production, separations and distinctions between different 
kinds of knowledge and the interaction between learning, knowledge and economic 
development have been formulated. But little agreement has been reached on those 
questions. 
 Mainly, knowledge and information appear in economic models in two different 
contexts. Standard microeconomics makes the fundamental assumption that the eco-
nomic system in based on rational choices made by individual agents. From this point 
of view it is important to establish how much information agents have about the 
world or the environment in which they operate, and what kind of ability they have to 
process that information. This perspective on knowledge focuses on a transformation 
process through which data describing the actual state of the world are transformed 
into information as indicators that are accessible to the agents representing the state of 
the world, and then into knowledge conceived as the result of processing the informa-
tion in analytical models. The other major perspective is that in which knowledge is 
regarded as an asset, and appears both as an input and as an output (i.e., as competen-
cies and innovations) in the production process. Then, innovation theory and compe-
tence-based theories of the firm are built to analyze how knowledge is produced and 
used in a market economy. 
Rational choice theory and evolutionary arguments 
The perspective of standard microeconomics supports that the observed configura-
tion of economic variables is the result of rational actors that make choices to maxi-
mize their utility. Richard Nelson ("Evolutionary Theorizing about Economic Chan-
ge") observes that the question about how that optimal decisions have been made is 
not a basic part of the theory: in any case the optimal response can be understood "as 
if" the actor had actually calculated it (Nelson 1994, p. 111). Then, the actor can be 
thought as being in possession of some kind of implicit knowledge about the context 
in which is involved. The theory can handle actor's errors, but only under the assump-
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tion that the actor has limited information about certain key parameters that determi-
ne some outcomes of making a decision. Nevertheless, systematic mistakes associated 
with ignorance or misunderstanding of the basic features of the situation are not ad-
mitted, i.e., the theory presumes the actor has basically correct understanding of the 
actual choices and the consequences of them as the theorist modeling individual be-
havior has. This is called the "perfect knowledge" assumption. And associated notion 
is that of equilibrium: each actor is assumed to optimize, and the optimization deci-
sions are presumed to be consistent with each other actor's optimizing action. This 
basic mode of explaining behavior has proved itself to be a satisfying way of exploring 
the way individuals and organizations make decisions. But evolutionary theorists stud-
ying long-run economic change have adopted a quite different alternative for many 
reasons. First, because rational choice theory, as Nelson points out, provides only li-
mited light on context where actors cannot be presumed to have applicable experience 
and where trial-and-error learning is going on. Second, because in many cases rational 
choice analysis provides multiple equilibria: in each it is possible to specify the optimi-
zing choice, but behavior differs greatly from one to another. To answer the question 
about why a particular equilibrium has turned out we have to appeal to evolutionary 
arguments. Third, rational choice theory provides a kind of explanation of behavior 
that takes the actor's objectives and constraints as given, while an explanation that 
considers how cultural and social institutions have evolved and affect the choices avai-
lable to actors seems to provide a deeper understanding of behavior than rational 
choice explanation alone. Then, rational choice theory would seem applicable to con-
texts with which the actors are familiar, and evolutionary theory can be understood as 
an attempt to deal with situations where the presumption of familiarity does not seem 
applicable. In fact, evolutionary theory might be of great help in the analysis of beha-
vior in contexts that involve novelty, i.e., evolutionary theory can be understood as a 
theory about how society learns and acquires knowledge about the world. This pers-
pective characterizes economists who have thought economic growth as a process 
driven by technological advance: almost all researchers on technological advance point 
out the uncertainties that are common in the process which seems to be outside the 
domain of rational choice theory. 
Evolutionary theory in economics 
There are two main analytic questions about evolutionary theory in economics: (1) a 
first question about what is the meaning of "evolutionary" as contrasted with a theory 
of another class, like neoclassical theory that employs "mechanical" analogies; and (2) 
a second question about the biological analogies invoked, i.e., about the key differen-
ces as well as the potentially useful analogies between evolution in biology and in eco-
nomics. As Nelson points out, one way to try to define evolutionary theory would be 
to start from biology and explore if one can find close analogies to the variables and 
concepts of that theory in other areas of inquiry, like in economics. But it would be 
more fruitful to start with the general and then examine applications in specific areas, 
like biology and economics as special cases (Nelson 1994, p. 113). 
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 Most researchers interested in these issues would agree that "evolutionary" is a 
term that has to be reserved for theories about dynamic time paths which try to ex-
plain how things change over time, or why things are what they are by showing "how 
they got there", Nelson says. From this point of view, theories that are wholly deter-
ministic should not be called "evolutionary": there is no point in saying that Kepler's 
laws of planetary motion and Newton's gravitational theory which explains them defi-
ne an evolutionary system. So, a theory of economic change that analyzes that process 
as moving to a competitive equilibrium, like in neoclassical growth theory, should not 
be considered as an evolutionary theory. There are many deterministic models emplo-
ying complex nonlinear dynamic equations that the authors have called "evolutionary", 
like the examples that can be found in The Economy as an Evolving Complex System, writ-
ten by P. Anderson, K. Arrow and D. Pines (1988), but they are not to be considered 
as evolutionary because this term should be limited to theories or models where there 
is an essential stochastic element. Thus, the term "evolutionary" is reserved for models 
that contain both systematic and random elements: in biological evolutionary theory 
the random elements are associated with the generation or preservation of species, 
and the systematic elements are related to selection pressures, and it could be thought 
that a useful extension of the term "evolutionary" to other areas require something 
analogous (Nelson 1994, p. 114). 
 The question here is if one can regard technology (or science itself) as evolving. 
There is a set of complex models of economic growth in which technical advance is 
the driving force and in which technology and industry structure coevolve. The out-
come of this process is growth of per worker productivity and per capita income, 
which are the standard measures of growth for economists. 
 Traditionally, economists have used biological analyses in writings about long-run 
economic growth, but with the publication of Solow's famous article "A contribution 
to the Theory of Economic Growth" (1956), the analysis of economic growth was 
brought under the neoclassical framework: the general equilibrium framework was dy-
namized to view economic growth as the moving equilibrium of a market economy in 
which technical advance is continuously increasing the productivity of inputs, and the 
capital stock is continuously growing with relation to labor inputs. In this way, an ex-
planation for the increase in labor productivity and per capita income is provided as a 
standard measure of growth. 
Technological change and economic growth 
Technological advance is an essential element of neoclassical account of growth, but it 
is virtually accepted by all researchers that technical advance has an important compo-
nent of uncertainty, differences of opinion among experts, and surprises in the pro-
cess, so mechanical analogies involving moving competitive equilibrium seem to be 
inappropriate: the process must be understood as an evolutionary one (Nelson 1994, 
p. 123). The problem is to devise a theory of growth capable of explaining the obser-
ved macroeconomic phenomena on the basis of an evolutionary theory of technical 
change. In such theory firms would be key actors, both in making investments to de-
velop new technologies and in the use of technologies to produce goods and services. 
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Economic growth in viewed as based on firms, which compete with each other 
through the technologies that they introduce and employ. 
 Firms are, from this point of view, the entities that are "fit", i.e., that are more or 
less profitable. But firms can also be regarded as merely the carriers of technologies, 
i.e., of particular practices and capabilities that determine what (and how) they do in 
particular circumstances. Nelson and Winter used the term "routines" to denote these 
practices and capabilities article "A contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth". 
The concept of routines is analytically equivalent to the genes in biological theory. 
And there are thee different kinds of routines: (1) those that might be called "standard 
operating procedures", which determine how and how much can be produced under 
various circumstances; these routines can be identified as "technologies"; (2) those 
routines that determine the investment behavior of the firm, i.e., the equations that 
govern its growth or decline as a function of its profits; and (3) the deliberative pro-
cesses of the firm that involve searching for better ways of doing things, which are ca-
lled R & D (research and development) processes. 
 Firms whose R & D turns up more profitable products will grow more then their 
competitors, but R & D also tends to bind firms together as a community since profi-
table innovations are imitated by other firms in the industry. The collection of firms in 
the industry is viewed as operating within an environment which is exogenously de-
termined, and can be interpreted as a "market" or a set of markets. In this theory, in 
the same way as routines are analogous to genes, firms are analogous to phenotypes or 
particular organisms in biological evolutionary theory, but there are important diffe-
rences: firms do not have a natural life and do not die, neither can be viewed as having 
a natural size; and living organisms are stuck with their genes, but firms are not stuck 
with their routines; on the contrary, they have built-in mechanisms for changing them. 
Also, attention has to be paid to the fact that the model applies only to economic sec-
tors where the market provides the selection mechanism, i.e., the model is not suited 
for dealing with sectors like defense or medical care, where political process determine 
what is "fit" and what is not. Nevertheless, the central purpose of the model is to ex-
plain economic growth at a macroeconomic level, and it does it. So, it can be said that 
this "Schumpeterian" model of economic growth is rich and has a lot of potential. But 
as Nelson says, it remains to be seen how many economists using the neoclassical the-
ory will be attracted to it (Nelson 1994, p. 124). 
Some critics concerning the evolutionary perspective in economics 
 1. Random variation and selection: As E. E. Harris points out, the current neo-
Darwinian doctrine is that variation occurs by chance and is completely random, and 
that natural selection eliminates unfavorable mutations allowing the favorable ones to 
proliferate: natural selection is a purely negative influence which simply eliminates the 
unfit. But reproduction is just one of the ways in which the process of self-
maintaining of living organisms occurs: as a self-maintaining system, an organism 
must modify its internal process and external behavior so as to adapt to changes in its 
environment, and if it fails to do this, it dies. As it reproduces itself, modifications of 
its structure and functioning which favor its survival will persist, while those that pro-
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ve to be unfavorable will succumb to hostile conditions. Then, the progeny of the ori-
ginal phenotype will evolve and the mechanism of evolution will be variation and na-
tural selection (Harris 1988). But Harris thinks that there are few but sufficient exam-
ples that persuade us that pure chance mutation is an inadequate explanation and that 
something more is needed. It is not an argument against the theory that mutation and 
natural selection are the means to evolution: the evidence in favor of that is impressi-
ve. But evolution cannot be the result of pure chance as it should be according to the 
current neo-Darwinism. In fact, there is no conclusive evidence that all mutations are 
entirely random, and there is good evidence that another factor of major significance 
is operating: biologist have discovered that genes do not act independently in determi-
ning isolated characters but they cooperate, and the results of this cooperation depend 
on their position in the chromosome. Then, the genome, i.e., the entire body of gene-
tic material, acts as a whole and changes within it can occur spontaneously. When tho-
se changes occur, whether by crossing over of chromosomes or by random mutation, 
they are mutually adjusted: some of them, which are disadvantageous, may remain re-
cessive but may later become dominant and, if having survival, they will persist. Harris 
says that this is not a surprising theory, because the organism is adaptive and self-
maintaining or would not be alive. Evolution should be nothing less than the extended 
process of the intrinsic adaptive character of living things, constantly maintaining and 
increasing their integrative coherence to become progressively more self-dependent 
and self-determining in changing circumstances (Harris, 1988:67). If so, the model of 
economic growth in which firms compete whith each other within the market is to be 
questioned. 
 2. Stability of markets: In his "Pluralism and Heuristic Identification" [Theory & Psy-
chology (2001), vol. 11 (6), 796-807], M. Schouten and H. L. de Jong observe that gene-
tic explanation, like other causal explanations, is to be considered as context-
dependent and observer-relative. Then, they have explanatory primacy only for certain 
questions: those for which they provide ways to trace out a trait's causal ancestry, but 
not for others. Further, a genetic factor is only relevant inasmuch as it refers to some 
stable ecological background, which is not the case in market processes. It is truth 
that, by picking out genes and connecting them to phenotypic traits, masses of other 
causal factors are ignored, which may be important in other contexts. This implies that 
by offering these identifications the theory is deliberately simplifying matters, but the-
se context-bound identifications must be considered legitimate simplifications. What is 
difficult to be sustained is that they can be applied in a non-stable ecological back-
ground. 
 3. Biological and physical assumptions: B. O. Küppers has pointed out that the field of 
biology is today undergoing a development as rapid and as exciting as the develop-
ment of physics at the beginning of the XXth century. However there is a significant 
difference: while modern physics brought with it a profound conceptual change 
through quantum theory and relativity theory, in contrast, modern biology has not in-
cluded such revolutionary changes. In fact, the Darwinian theory of evolution and its 
physico-chemical counterpart, the theory of biological self-organization, provide a 
stable and self-consistent foundation for the live sciences. Nevertheless, there has 
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been violent controversies within evolutionary biology concerning the "tautological 
objection", i.e., the question of whether the Darwinian principle of the survival of the 
fittest, which is the basis of the entire evolutionary doctrine, could be formulated wit-
hout involving a circular argument in which the greatest fitness is defined as the pro-
perty of having survived. The physical justification of the selection principle in the 
framework of the molecular theory of evolution has ultimately decided the controver-
sy in favor of the orthodox Darwinian position (Küppers 1999, p. 275). 
 In Niels Bohr's famous essay of 1933 ("Light and life"), it is predicted that the 
theoretical basis of biology would undergo the same changes as the physics of micros-
copic systems had done. Bohr believed that the revolutionary idea of complementarity 
in microphysics could be transferred to biology, arguing that a complete physical des-
cription of a living organism would never be possible because the required molecular 
or atomic analysis would lead to the destruction and death of the organism. As one 
can see, in biology as in quantum physics there would never be a clear distinction bet-
ween what is observed and the observer, and consequently a description of the living 
phenomenon independent of the observer is impossible. This is why Bohr considered 
the existence of life to be an elementary fact which could not be explained and must 
be accepted as an irreducible axiom of biology, just as classical mechanics viewed the 
quantum of physics as an irreducible quantity which existence could not be deduced 
(Küppers 1999, p. 276). 
 Bohr's thesis of the irreductibility of life has been present in the philosophical and 
theoretical debate in biology for several decades, until the successes of molecular bio-
logy in the nineteen-fifties and early sixties pointed out that Bohr's argument did not 
hold. Bohr had seen a physically inexplicable property of life in the ability of an orga-
nism to reproduce itself, but now is known that this is just the macroscopic expression 
of a microscopic property of molecules, i.e., the inherent capability of DNA-molecules 
to reproduce themselves. Today, Bohr's thesis is only of historical interest, but it con-
tains an idea that reflects an important step in the development of modern science, i.e., 
the fundamental idea of microscopic physics that an object can only be understood in 
relation to the subject that observes it, even if this has not practical importance for 
macroscopic objects. With the abandonment of the idea of an absolute object, mi-
croscopic physics introduced a conceptual change that had already been proposed by 
relativistic physics. But, even when Bohr's approach ultimately failed, the doubts that 
he expressed about the theoretical bases of biology pointed in the right direction: 
theoretical biology will have to depart from the idea of absolute information the same 
way physics had to abandon the ideas of absolute space, absolute time and absolute 
objects (Küppers 1999, p. 277). 
 The complexity of living matter is dynamically ordered and functionally effective, 
and is expressed in the organism's purposeful construction and activity. This is the as-
pect that is related to information in biology when the complexity of living matter is 
interpreted as being completely "controlled" by information. The working hypothesis 
according to which all the processes of life, from metabolism to heredity, are instruc-
ted by genetic information receives strong support from molecular biology, and has 
been so successful that the ideas of storage, transfer and generation of information are 
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today fundamentals of theoretical biology. The fusion of the information theory and 
the Darwinian evolution theory has given a unified theory for the generation of biolo-
gical information and has determined the direction of the theoretical debate on biolo-
gical self-organization. 
 However, the concept of information is derived not from natural sciences but 
from the communication theory, which represents a completely different conceptual 
framework. We usually speak of a purposefully constructed machine or a purposeful 
plan of action, and in the same way biologists speak of a purposeful, i.e., information 
directed, functional context in living organisms, which lead us to the problem of the 
introduction of the semantic aspect of the information into biology. This problem is 
of considerable importance for the intertheoretical relation between biology and phy-
sics. The fact that the concept of information is extra-biological, and the amazing pa-
rallel between genetic and human language (certain molecular components of the bio-
logical information carrier, the nucleotides, function as letters in a genetic alphabet, 
and these letters are grouped in defined code-words), raise the question of whether 
genetic information really is an inherent property of living matter, or whether it is me-
rely an arbitrary way of describing things. The central question is whether information 
is a natural entity, in the same way as gravity or electricity in physics, or not. (Küppers 
1999, p. 279). The majority of biologists appear to accept that biological information 
is a natural entity which expresses itself in the specific structures of biological macro-
molecules. However, this point of view has been strongly criticized by constructivistic 
philosophers of science as P. Janich (1992). The main attack has been directed against 
the application of the concept of information in non-human areas. From this view-
point, the transfer, storage and production of information can only be understood as 
metaphors, the object of which takes shape only when related to communication bet-
ween two human beings. 
 As it can be seen, the discussion about the concept of evolution and natural selec-
tion is not to be closed easily. Then, the Darwinian framework of evolutionary eco-
nomics is in debate, and will have to prove through empirical confrontation that it is a 
convenient theoretical approach to economic phaenomena. 
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